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On the Imitation Strategy for Games on Graphs
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Abstract
In evolutionary game theory, repeated two-player games are used to study strategy evolution
in a population under natural selection. As the evolution greatly depends on the interaction
structure, there has been growing interests in studying the games on graphs. In this setting,
players occupy the vertices of a graph and play the game only with their immediate neighbours.
Various evolutionary dynamics have been studied in this setting for different games. Due to the
complexity of the analysis, however, most of the work in this area is experimental. This paper
aims to contribute to a more complete understanding, by providing rigorous analysis. We study
the imitation dynamics on two classes of graph: cycles and complete graphs. We focus on three
well known social dilemmas, namely the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Stag Hunt and the Snowdrift
Game. We also consider, for completeness, the so-called Harmony Game. Our analysis shows
that, on the cycle, all four games converge fast, either to total cooperation or total defection.
On the complete graph, all but the Snowdrift game converge fast, either to cooperation or
defection. The Snowdrift game reaches a metastable state fast, where cooperators and defectors
coexist. It will converge to cooperation or defection only after spending time in this state which
is exponential in the size, n, of the graph. In exceptional cases, it will remain in this state
indefinitely. Our theoretical results are supported by experimental investigations.
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory, games on graphs, imitation update rule, convergence,
symmetric 2× 2 games
1 Introduction
Game theory is used as a mathematical tool to analyse strategic and economic decision-making
by rational agents [11]. Evolutionary game theory, on the other hand, studies the evolution of
strategies in these situations by natural selection. Thus it models the adaptive behaviour of
agents who meet repeatedly. Different strategic situations can be modelled by simple games, for
example repeated 2× 2 games with appropriate payoff matrices (see, for example, [4, 18]). This
is the setting we consider here.
In this context, there are two players, each having two pure strategies (Cooperate andDefect).
Here we study symmetric games. A game is said to be symmetric if it puts each player in the
same strategic situation. Each player’s payoff depends on the strategies chosen by the player and
the opponent. The payoff obtained when both players cooperate is denoted by R (the reward
for mutual cooperation). The payoff gained when both defect is denoted by P (the punishment
for mutual defection). Finally, T (the temptation to defect) is earned by the defector and S (the
sucker’s payoff ) is earned by the cooperator when one player defects and the other cooperates.
Hence, the payoff matrix is:
[ Cooperate Defect
Cooperate R S
Defect T P
]
.
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Assuming strict ordinality of the payoffs (i.e. all four payoffs are distinct) gives rise to 12
different strategic games that are symmetric [4]. In order to select the most relevant games,
some more realistic assumptions are made about the payoffs. First, it is assumed that unilateral
defection is preferred to unilateral cooperation (i.e. T > S), thus there is an incentive for non-
cooperative behaviour [18]. Furthermore, for a dilemma to arise, the following conditions need
to be satisfied [7]: (1) mutual cooperation is preferred over mutual defection (i.e. R > P ),
(2) mutual cooperation is preferred to unilateral cooperation (i.e. R > S), and (3) unilateral
defection is preferred over mutual cooperation (i.e. T > R) or mutual defection is preferred over
unilateral cooperation (i.e. P > S). All these assumptions yield four strategic situations. They
are : T > R > S > P which represents the Hawk-Dove or Snowdrift game (SG); R > T >
P > S or R > P > T > S which represents the Assurance or Stag-Hunt game (SH) [7]; and
T > R > P > S which represents the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PD). In addition to these
well known social dilemmas, another game is widely studied which models the situation where
the interests of the players match. This is represented by the regime defined by the rankings
R > S > T > P [6] and R > T > S > P [18]. This game is called Harmony game (HG). In this
game, cooperating strictly dominates defecting so that the only possible equilibrium of the game
is for both players to cooperate. As this equilibrium is Pareto-optimal, there is no dilemma in
this game.
We use the normalisation of [15] to simplify the analysis. That is, we normalise the payoff
for mutual cooperation (R) to 1 and the payoff for mutual defection (P ) to 0. Then, as done in
[15], if we restrict 0 ≤ T ≤ 2 and −1 ≤ S ≤ 1, the behaviour of all four games can be captured,
with each game corresponding to a quadrant in the ST plane as shown in Figure 1(a). Note
that the quadrant for SH includes only the version defined by R > T > P > S which is the
standard version studied in the literature (see, for example, [7, 13, 16]). Thus the other version
defined by R > P > T > S is omitted in this study.
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Figure 1: Game domains.
Understanding the evolution of cooperation among selfish agents is clearly an important
and challenging task. Much effort has been put into achieving this using the PD game as a
model [10]. When the population is mixed, where each player is equally likely to meet any other,
natural selection favours defection over cooperation [9]. Hence, Nowak and May [10] studied the
impact of arranging PD players in a two-dimensional array and concluded that cooperators and
defectors can coexist indefinitely. Since then, considerable attention has been given to studying
evolutionary game dynamics in spatial settings. In these settings, players are arranged as the
vertices of a network and can play the game only with their immediate neighbours. The impact
of network on the emergence of cooperation has also been emphasised in [5, 12, 16]. The way in
which cooperation evolves in spatial settings is called network reciprocity [9], where cooperators
survive by forming a cluster and helping each other within the cluster so that the defectors at
the border cannot fare any better. In this paper we consider two extreme cases of the spatial
setting. First, we consider the cycle graph in which the impact of the topology on the evolution
is strongest [11]. Second, we consider the complete graph which models a mixed population.
Several previous studies have focused on these types of graphs (see, for example, [1, 5, 11, 15]).
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In evolutionary game theory, the payoffs are regarded as the Darwinian fitness [11]. During
the evolution, strategies earning higher payoffs become more common in the population. Inher-
itance and imitation are two mechanisms by which successful strategies may spread. Between
the two, imitation gives the more practical dynamics [3, p. 86]. Many versions of imitation
have been studied in this context. Nowak and May [10] studied the imitation rule known as
unconditional-imitation or imitate-the-best. Here, each player imitates the neighbour earning
the highest payoff among the immediate neighbours and himself, in each round of the game.
Furthermore, one of the three update rules studied in [11] is the asynchronous version of the
proportional-imitation [3, p. 87] rule. Under this rule, in each round of the game, a random
individual is given a chance to update his strategy. The individual then chooses a neighbour
uniformly at random and imitates the neighbour with some probability proportional to the
payoff difference. (A simpler version of this update rule is called imitate the better [3, p. 87],
in which an updating individual always imitates the randomly selected neighbour, but only if
the neighbour’s payoff is higher.) The synchronous version of this has been studied in [14, 15].
In this rule, each individual updates his strategy at the end of each round of the game in this
fashion. ([14] refers to this as the replicator rule.) Finally, a stochastic combination of both
versions of the proportional-imitation rule has been studied in [13]. Among the variations of im-
itation update rule, proportional-imitation rules perform optimally, both from the individual’s
perspective and from the perspective of the population as a whole [17]. In this paper, we will
study the synchronous version of the proportional-imitation rule. In the rest of this paper, we
frequently refer to this rule just as the imitation update rule.
Most of the previous work on imitation rules has been empirical. For instance, the imitate-
the-best rule on a two dimensional grid was studied in [10] using simulations; the synchronous
proportional-imitation rule on different types of graphs was explored in [14, 15] using simulations;
and both of these imitation rules were investigated in [13] using simulations. The reason for
the lack of rigorous analysis is that a vast number of possible patterns of strategies can be
generated [9]. The empirical results give insights into the evolution, but some of the results
cannot properly be understood without theoretical underpinning. On the theoretical side, the
asynchronous version of the proportional-imitation-rule on the cycle was analysed in [11] using
fixation probabilities. The fixation probability is the probability that a population adopting the
same strategy is overrun by a single individual adopting a mutant strategy. Although the results
presented in [11] are interesting, the analysis based on fixation probabilities has two weaknesses.
First, it does not show what happens when mutants invade in pairs, triples, etc. Second, it does
not reveal any information about the rate of convergence to cooperation.
Here we will study the synchronous proportional-imitation rule on cycles and complete graphs
rigorously. Similar rigorous results were given for the Pavlov or Highest Cumulative Reward
rule in the Iterated PD game (see [1, 8] for details). Here, we make no assumptions about the
initial configuration. We then calculate the time it takes for a steady state to be reached in
these settings. By doing so, we provide rigorous support for the experimental results observed
by [15] in complete graphs. In addition, we do a similar study for the cycle. Interestingly, this
simple type of graph gives evidence that there are graphs on which cooperators and defectors
cannot coexist for any of the four games, except for some specific payoffs values (i.e. T = S + 1
and T = (S + 1)/2). Furthermore we provide supporting simulation results for both types of
graph.
The outline of this paper is as follows: Some preliminaries are described in Section 2. Sec-
tion 3 investigates the dynamics of the imitation on the cycle, while Section 4 investigates the
same on the complete graph. Empirical results appear in Section 5. The impact of our results
is discussed in Section 6. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
Let G = (V,E) be a connected graph with vertices V = {vi : i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1}. Each player at
the vertex i (0 ≤ i ≤ n−1) has a state Si ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 represents defection and 1 represents
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cooperation. In addition, ⋆ is used as the don’t care symbol for the states when the particular
value of the state does not matter in the discussion (e.g. 0 ⋆ 1000).
We will now define formally the proportional-imitation rule [3] with synchronous update.
According to this rule, in each generation, each vertex vi (0 ≤ i < n) plays the game with all
its Ni neighbours, and stores the accrued payoff for that generation as Pi. At the end of the
generation, all vertices simultaneously update their strategies as follows: each vertex vi chooses
one of its neighbours u.a.r.1 (say vj) and copies the strategy of vj with probability
pi = max
{
0,
Pj − Pi
mα
}
,
where α = max{T, 1} −min{S, 0}, and m = max{Ni, Nj}. The denominator mα is a scaling
factor which ensures that pi ∈ [0, 1]. Here, pi is called the switching probability of vi. Note that
if Pi ≥ Pj , vi keeps the same strategy, i.e. the switching probability pi = 0. Clearly, the value
of m is 2 for cycles and n− 1 for complete graphs.
We are interested to find the absorption time which is defined as the time required for the
system to reach a steady state. The absorption time is determined in terms of the number of
generations it takes for absorption as a function of the number of players, n. All-cooperate
(where all players cooperate) and all-defect (where all players defect) are clearly two steady
states under the imitation update rule. And there may exist other steady state configurations,
where cooperators and defectors can coexist. Once the system reaches any of these states, it
will remain there forever.
3 Imitation on the cycle
Suppose that a minimum of three agents occupy the vertices of a cycle graph G = (V,E), where
V = {vi : i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1} and E = {{vi, vi+1} : i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1} .
Here and throughout this paper, addition and subtraction on the vertex subscripts is performed
modulo n. We now introduce some terminology. Let S ∈ {0, 1}V be given. A cooperator-run
(resp. defector-run) in S is an interval [i, j] where 0 ≤ i, j < n, such that Sk = 1 (resp. 0) for
i ≤ k ≤ j and Si−1 = 0 (resp. 1), Sj+1 = 0 (resp. 1). We use c-run to denote the cooperator-run
and d-run to denote the defector-run. It is possible to have j ≤ i, since we are working modulo
n. Clearly all runs are disjoint.
Suppose that Rd = [i, j] is a d-run where the subscript d stands for defectors. The length
of the run Rd, denoted by ℓ(Rd), is the number of defectors in the run, i.e. ℓ(Rd) = j − i + 1
mod n. We will refer to a d-run of length ℓ as an ℓd-run. A 1d-run will also be called a singleton
defector and a 2d-run will also be called a pair of defectors. There are two outer rim edges
associated with Rd, namely {i − 1, i} and {j, j + 1}. We use similar notations for c-runs, but
with subscript c, which stands for cooperators. For example, ℓc-run represents a c-run of length
ℓ. A run, c-run or d-run, is said to grow if its length increases. A run whose length cannot
be reduced to zero through any combination of updates is called a barrier. A run is said to be
deleted if all its vertices change from defector to cooperator or vice versa.
The main results for the game on cycle are listed below. The proofs are presented in the
subsequent sections.
Initial configuration: We assume that the initial configuration for the game is random: each
vertex on the cycle is independently assigned as a cooperator with constant probability pc and
as a defector with probability 1−pc at the beginning of the game. Then, the following theorems
give the absorption time for the n-vertex cycle.
Theorem 1. If the payoffs are such that S + 1 < T , then the game converges to the all-defect
state in time O(n) with high probability.
1uniformly at random
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Si Si+1 pi = Pi+1−Pi2α
0 0 (Si+2−Si−1)T2α
0 1 (2S−T )+Si+2(1−S)−Si−1T2α
1 0
(T−2S)+Si+2T−Si−1(1−S)
2α
1 1 (Si+2−Si−1)(1−S)2α
Figure 2: Switching probabilities for vi, provided vi+1 has been chosen by vi for imitation.
Theorem 2. If the payoffs satisfy
Case I: S+12 < T < S + 1 and T > 2S, or
Case II: S+12 < T < 2S,
then the game converges to the all-cooperate state in time O(n) with high probability.
Theorem 3. If the payoffs satisfy
Case I: 0 < T < S+12 and T > 2S, or S < T < 2S and T <
S+1
2 , or
Case II: T < S,
then the game converges to the all-cooperate state in time O(log n) with high probability.
Remark 1. In this paper, an event Yn which depends on the size of the graph n is said to happen
with high probability, or in short w.h.p., if Pr(Yn)→ 1 as n→∞.
3.1 Analysis
Suppose, without loss of generality, that the random neighbour chosen by vi for imitation is
vi+1. Then, the switching probabilities of vi for different values of Si and Si+1 are given in
Figure 2. Clearly, we can ignore the two cases where the updating vertex and the randomly
chosen neighbour already follow the same strategy, hence imitation has no effect. Ignoring these
cases and expanding the formulae in Figure 2 with the possible values of Si−1 and Si+2, we obtain
the results in Figure 3. This figure also shows the variable names we use to denote these different
probabilities. Now, it is obvious that the switching probability of vi, when it randomly chooses
vi+1 for imitation, depends on the states Si−1,Si,Si+1, and Si+2. For notational convenience we
write these states as Si−1[Si]Si+1Si+2 (e.g. 0[1]11), enclosing the state of vi in square brackets.
Note that the prerequisite for a player to switch strategy through imitation is to have at least
one neighbour with a different strategy. Hence, the strategy changes on the cycle can happen
only at the vertices of the outer rim edges of a c-run or a d-run, since all other vertices incident
on a run have both their neighbours employing the same strategy as theirs. So, it is sufficient
to focus our analysis on the borders of runs.
For the analysis, we first need to know whether the values for the pi’s are zero or not. As
mentioned earlier, each game corresponds to a quadrant in the ST plane as shown in Figure 1(a).
Yet, we will not use this game-based categorisation in our analysis. This is because, although
these games have different (α, S, T ) values, they share the same behaviour in some cases, as a
result of having the same sign for Pi − Pj :
• T > S+12 for PD and SG
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Si Si+1 Si−1Si+200 01 10 11
0 1 a = 2S−T2α b =
S+1−T
2α c =
2(S−T )
2α d =
S+1−2T
2α
1 0 a¯ = T−2S2α c¯ =
2(T−S)
2α b¯ =
T−S−1
2α d¯ =
2T−S−1
2α
Figure 3: Switching probabilities for vi for different possible neighbour-states.
• T > 2S for PD and SH
• T > S for PD, SH and SG
Instead, we categorise the game domain into six regions based on the dynamics for the
purpose of analysis, as shown in Figure 1(b) with labels A, B, C, D, E and F. Each of these
regions is characterised by its boundary conditions. They are:
• Region A : T > S + 1
• Region B : S+12 < T < S + 1 and T > 2S
• Region C : S+12 < T < 2S
• Region D : 2S < T < S+12
• Region E : S < T < 2S and T < S+12
• Region F : T < S
Next we prove a lemma that will be used frequently in the proofs.
Lemma 1. Let ℓt be the length of a d-run at time t. If the length of the run reduces by at least
p in expectation for some constant p > 0, the probability that the run is not deleted in ℓ0p(1−ε)
generations is at most e
− ε
2ℓ0
2(1−ε) for any ε > 0.
Proof. Let T be the time at which ℓt becomes 0 for the first time. Let Xt be the decrement of
the length of the run at time t. Thus
Xt =
{
0 if ℓt = 0,
1 otherwise.
Thus, for t ≤ T , the decrements are independent random variables with expectation E[Xt] ≥
p where Xt ∈ {0, 1}. Thus
ℓt = ℓ0 −
t∑
i=1
Xi .
For any t ≤ T , using the Chernoff bound, we get
Pr
(
t∑
i=1
Xi ≤ pt(1− ε)
)
≤ exp(− 12ε2pt), (1)
for any ε > 0. Since ℓT = 0, we have
T∑
i=1
Xi ≥ ℓ0 .
Hence, applying (1) for T steps, we get
Pr
(
T ≥ ℓ0
p(1− ε)
)
≤ exp(− 12ε2pT ) ≤ exp
(
− 12ε2p ℓ0p(1−ε)
)
= exp
(
− ε2ℓ02(1−ε)
)
.
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Next we explore some properties of the initial random configuration.
3.1.1 Properties of the initial configuration
In this study, the initial configuration is assumed to be generated randomly as follows: each
vertex on the cycle is independently assigned as a cooperator with constant probability pc and
as a defector with probability pd = 1−pc at the beginning of the game. Hence, at the beginning
of the game, the expected number of cooperators present on the cycle is npc. So, it is reasonable
to assume pc = Ω(1/n), so that there will be some cooperators at the start.
Lemma 2. The probability that there is no kc-run, where k ≥ 1 is a constant, on the cycle at
the beginning of the game is at most e−p
k
c
⌊n/k⌋.
Proof. Let Pk be the probability that k-consecutive vertices are not all cooperators. Hence
Pk = (1− pkc ) .
There are ⌊n/k⌋ disjoint k-segments on the cycle. As each vertex is assigned the initial
state independently, these segments are independent. Hence, the probability that none of those
segments is all-cooperators is
P
⌊n/k⌋
k = (1− pkc )⌊n/k⌋ ≤ e−p
k
c ⌊n/k⌋,
and the lemma is proved.
Lemma 3. The following statement holds with high probability. The longest c-run generated in
the initial configuration is of length λ log n for any λ > 0 such that λ log(1/pc) > 1.
Proof. Let rℓ be the number of c-runs of length ℓ. So,
E[rℓ] = npc
ℓ .
If ℓ = λ logn, then
E[rℓ] = npc
ℓ = npc
λ logn = n1−λ log(1/pc) .
So,
Pr(rℓ 6= 0) ≤ n1−λ log(1/pc) .
Since n1−λ log(1/pc) → 0 as n → ∞ for λ log(1/pc) > 1, we do not expect to see any runs of
length λ logn or longer and the lemma is proved.
Lemma 4. The following statement holds with high probability. The longest d-run generated in
the initial configuration is of length λ log n for any λ > 0 such that λ log(1/pd) > 1.
Proof. The proof is entirely similar to that of Lemma 3, so will be omitted.
Lemma 5. Consider a segment on the cycle having d-runs of any length separated by 1c-runs.
Such a segment must have a c-run of length greater than 1 at each end. Now, the following
statement about this segment holds with high probability. The length of the longest such segment
in the initial configuration is O(log n).
Proof. The length of the segment can be calculated using a simple random walk. Suppose the
vertices are assigned as cooperators (or ones) or defectors (or zeroes) from v0 to vn−1. At any
time t, there can be four combinations of present and future assignments. They are: 00, 01, 10,
and 11. Consider these as four states of a Markov chainM, and denote these states by s0, s1, s2,
and s3 respectively. The transition probabilities for these states are shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: A random walk representing the generation of initial configuration, modelled as a four-
state Markov chain. The edges of the state diagram are labelled with transition probabilities.
We are interested to find the total length of the d-runs connected by 1c-runs. Thus, we need
to find the time to return to s3, or equivalently, the time to go from s2 to s3. This time is
exactly the length of the d-runs separated by singleton cooperators.
Clearly, from any other states of M, there is a probability at least p2c of reaching s3 in two
steps. Hence the probability that s3 will not be reached in 2t steps is at most p
2t
c . Thus the
probability that there exists any such run of length λ logn, for any λ > 0, is at most
npλ lognc <
1
n
, if λ >
2
log(1/pc)
.
Hence, if λ > 2log(1/pc) , the probability of finding this special configuration of length λ logn
tends to 0 as n → ∞. Thus, with high probability, the maximum length of the segment is
O(log n).
Lemma 6. The following statement holds with high probability. The longest sequence of al-
ternating 1’s and 0’s in the initial configuration is at most 2λ logn, for any λ > 0 such that
λ
(
log(1/pc) + log(1/pd)
)
> 1.
Proof. Let rℓ be the number of occurrences of a chain of length ℓ having alternating 1’s and 0’s.
Suppose ℓ is even, without loss of generality. Then we have
E[rℓ] = npc
ℓ
2 pd
ℓ
2 .
If ℓ = 2λ logn, then
E[rℓ] = npc
λ lognpd
λ logn = n1−λ log(1/pc)−λ log(1/pd) .
So, if λ
(
log(1/pc) + log(1/pd)
)
> 1, we have
Pr(rℓ 6= 0) ≤ n1−λ log(1/pc)−λ log(1/pd) → 0 as n→∞.
3.1.2 Emergence of defection
In this section we prove that the defection emerges fast for the games in the region labelled A in
Figure 1(b). This region, having S+1 < T , covers the whole PD domain and half the domain of
SH and SG. The table below shows which of the switching probabilities are zero for the vertex
vi.
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Si Si+1 Si−1Si+200 01 10 11
0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 + + + +
Here, no defector will ever become a cooperator, but cooperators can become defectors. So,
the game converges to the all-defect state fast. The following lemmas prove this.
Lemma 7. Suppose Rc is the longest c-run in the cycle when the game is started and let
ℓ(Rc) = γ. Provided S + 1 < T , probability that all-defect state is not reached in γb¯(1−ε)
generations is at most e
− ε
2γ
2(1−ε) , for any ε > 0.
Proof. In synchronous updating, each vertex updates its strategy at the end of every generation.
When S + 1 < T , the only vertices that imitate their neighbours are the cooperators at either
end of a c-run. (Note that a 1c-run has only one such cooperator.) A cooperator at this position
chooses a defector for imitation with probability 12 . Let p be defined to be the minimum of the
four possible switching probabilities (see Figure 3). It can be easily verified that we have
p = min{a¯, b¯, c¯, d¯} = b¯ .
Then, an ℓc-run (2 ≤ ℓ < n) reduces in length at either end with probability at least 12p and
a 1c-run is deleted with probability at least p, in every generation. Thus, the expected decrease
in the length of any c-run is at least b¯. The time it takes for the longest c-run to be deleted
completely is precisely the absorption time, since shorter runs are deleted faster. The result
then follows from Lemma 1.
In the worst case, the length of the longest c-run (γ) can be n. This means all players
cooperate at the beginning, which is an absorbing state. Hence, the all-defect state is never
reached. But, if γ = n − 1, in view of Lemma 7, it takes (n−1)
b¯(1−ε) ≈ nb¯ generations for the
convergence to defection. However, it was shown in Lemma 4 that, when pc < 1, the length of
the longest c-run is O(log n). Theorem 1 combines all these results.
Proof of Theorem 1: By Lemma 4, the longest c-run present on the cycle at the beginning
of the game is of length λ logn w.h.p for any λ > 0 such that λ log(1/pc) > 1. Then, by
Lemma 7, the probability that the steady state has not been reached in
λ logn
b¯(1− ε) = O(log n)
generations is at most n
− ε
2λ
2(1−ε) for any ε > 0, where b¯ = T−S−12α and α = max{T, 1}−min{S, 0}.
For a suitable value for λ, this probability tends to 0 as n→∞ which completes the proof. 
3.1.3 Emergence of cooperation
In this section, we prove that cooperation emerges fast in regions B, C, D, E, and F. Before
analysing these, let us first look at some common characteristics shown by the regions B, C, D
and E. Figure 5 shows which of the switching probabilities are zero for each of these regions.
Note, from Figure 1(b), that the regions B, C, D and E satisfy T < S + 1. Hence, Lemma 8
holds for these regions.
Lemma 8. In B, C, D and E, if a c-run Rc of length at least 2 is adjacent to d-runs of length
at least 2 at each end, the c-run grows in length or remains as it is. The expected growth of the
run in one generation is b.
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Si Si+1 Si−1Si+200 01 10 11
0 1 0 + 0 0
1 0 + + 0 +
(a) Region B
Si Si+1 Si−1Si+200 01 10 11
0 1 + + 0 0
1 0 0 + 0 +
(b) Region C
Si Si+1 Si−1Si+200 01 10 11
0 1 0 + 0 +
1 0 + + 0 0
(c) Region D
Si Si+1 Si−1Si+200 01 10 11
0 1 + + 0 +
1 0 0 + 0 0
(d) Region E
Figure 5: Switching probabilities for B, C, D and E.
Proof. The proof is based on the observation that the switching probability is positive for 0[0]11
and zero for 1[1]00 in the regions in question.
Now, suppose Rc = [i, j] such that ℓ(Rc) ≥ 2. Suppose Rc is bordered by at least two
defectors on both sides, so we have ⋆001100⋆. The vertices of the outer-rim edges of Rc, namely
vi−1, vi, vj and vj+1, are in states 0, 1, 1 and 0 respectively. Possible changes to these vertices
after a generation are:
• vi−1, which is a defector itself, has another defector on its left and a cooperator on its
right. Hence, switching can happen only if vi−1 tries to imitate from its right. As Fig-
ure 3 indicates, this happens with probability 12b (as the right neighbour is chosen with
probability 12 and the actual switching happens independently with probability b which is
non-zero according to Figure 5). This makes Rc longer in length by 1.
• vi, which is a cooperator itself, has another cooperator on its right and a defector on its
left. Hence an effective imitation can happen only when it copies from its left neighbour.
But, as shown in Figure 5, the probability of switching to defection in this scenario (i.e.
1[1]00) is zero. Hence, this vertex will not change its strategy.
• By symmetry, vj does the same as vi.
• By symmetry, vj+1 does the same as vi−1.
Hence, Rc grows in length with some non-zero probability. The expected growth of Rc at
either end is 12b in one generation. Hence the total expected growth of the run equals b.
Remark 2. Lemma 8 implies that an ℓc-run (ℓ ≥ 2) bordered by at least 2 defectors is hard to
eliminate in B, C, D and E. We say “hard” because, as we will see later, one such configuration
can be eliminated by another in some regions. By combining this observation with the dynamics
of each region separately, we later establish the conditions determining a barrier for each region.
Now we investigate the dynamics of a singleton cooperator having at least two defectors at
its either end.
Lemma 9. A singleton cooperator (1c-run) bordered on both sides by at least two defectors (i.e.
⋆00100⋆) can grow up to length 3 in C and E, whereas it is deleted in B and D.
Proof. Let Rc = [i, i] be a 1c-run and let Si−2 = Si−1 = Si+1 = Si+2 = 0. Here, vi might
imitate both its neighbours and has 0[1]00 in both cases. As the comparison tables in Figure 6
show, the switching probability for 0[1]00 is positive in B and D, and zero in E and C. Hence,
vi might become a defector in B and D, but will remain as a cooperator in E and C.
Next, let us see what happens to the neighbours of Rc, namely vi−1 and vi+1. It can be
easily verified that both vi−1 and vi+1 have a defector at one side and the cooperator vi at the
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Si Si+1 Si−1Si+200
0 1 0
1 0 +
(a) B and D
Si Si+1 Si−1Si+200
0 1 +
1 0 0
(b) C and E
Figure 6: The switching probabilities related to singleton cooperators
other side. So, the switching can happen only when these vertices copy from vi. In that case,
the defectors appear as 0[0]10 which has a zero switching probability in B and D and a non-zero
switching probability in C and E.
To sum up, in B and D, while vi switches to defection, its defector neighbours remain
unchanged, hence Rc is deleted. But, in C and E, while vi remains as a cooperator, its neighbours
can become cooperators too, potentially increasing the length of the 1c-run up to 3.
A singleton defector having longer c-run neighbours has the potential to grow in regions B
and C, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 10. A singleton defector (1d-run) bordered on both sides by at least two cooperators
(i.e. ⋆11011⋆) can grow up to length 3 in B and C, whereas it is deleted in D and E.
Proof. In this case, the defector in the middle could imitate from both its neighbours and has
the neighbourhood of 1[0]11 on either side, and the adjacent cooperators can copy only from the
middle defector and have 1[1]01. The dynamics for these two cases are compared in Figure 7.
Si Si+1 Si−1Si+211
0 1 0
1 0 +
(a) B and C
Si Si+1 Si−1Si+211
0 1 +
1 0 0
(b) E and D
Figure 7: The switching probabilities related to singleton defectors
As Figure 7 shows, in E and D, the switching probability is positive for 1[0]11 and zero for
1[1]01. Consequently, in ⋆11011⋆, the defector might become a cooperator while its neigbouring
cooperators remain unchanged. Hence, the 1d-run is deleted in E and D. But, in the case of
B and C, the opposite is true: the middle defector will remain as it is while its cooperator
neighbours switch to defection. Thus, the singleton defector might become a 2d-run or a 3d-run
as claimed.
Let us now analyse each region separately.
Region B (S+12 < T < S + 1 and T > 2S)
Figure 1(b) shows this region with label B. Figure 5(a) shows which cases have zero and non-
zero switching probabilities. In this section we prove that cooperation evolves in linear time in
this region. Analysing the actual imitation process to prove this is complicated. Fortunately,
we can use a simplified model for this purpose. The following lemma forms the basis for the
simplification of the process.
Lemma 11. An ℓc-run (ℓ ≥ 4) is a barrier in region B, whereas a c-run shorter than 4 might
be deleted through a sequence of updates.
Proof. In region B,
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a 1c-run is always deleted: Lemma 9 shows that a 1c-run is deleted if it has two defectors
on both sides. Now, when a 1c-run is adjacent to a 1d-run on either side, as in ⋆10[1]01⋆,
it is readily verified that the 1c-run will be turned into a defector whereas the adjacent
defectors remain unchanged. Thus, a 1c-run cannot grow if it is adjacent to singleton
defectors at both ends. Obviously this would be the case when a 1c-run has a singleton
defector on one side and at least two defectors on the other side.
It is noteworthy that if all the cooperators on the cycle exist as 1c-runs, the game converges
to all-defect, since singleton cooperators can never survive.
a 2c-run can grow or be deleted: A 2c-run grows if it is bordered by at least two defectors
as shown in Lemma 8. Now, when a 2c-run is adjacent to 1d-runs on both sides, either of
the 1d-runs can grow, deleting a cooperator in the 2c-run, as illustrated in Lemma 10, and
removing the 2c-run completely. Thus, when a 2c-run is adjacent to a 1d-run on one side
and at least two defectors on the other, it has the possibility of growing or reducing to a
1c-run which is subsequently deleted.
An interesting case shows that even a 2c run bordered by at least two defectors can be
removed if it is adjacent to another 2c-run. Consider the configuration 0011001100. This
might first become 0011101100, then become 001100010, and finally become 001100000,
deleting one of the 2c-runs completely.
a 3c-run can grow or be deleted: Like the pair of cooperators, although a 3c-run can grow
when it is bordered by two defectors at either end, there is a possibility of it being deleted
if it has singleton defectors at both ends.
an ℓc-run (ℓ ≥ 4) can never be deleted: Even if there are singleton defectors at either end
of a 4c-run , the run’s length will be reduced to 2 in the worst case. The resulting 2c-
run will then be bordered by two defectors, hence will start growing again, as shown in
Lemma 8. Obviously, longer runs are more stable and cannot be deleted.
In short, the key observations are: 1c-runs are always deleted; 2c-runs and 3c-runs might
grow or be deleted; and, runs of length 4 or more can never be deleted. Hence a run of length
4 or more is a barrier.
Clearly, the worst case for the evolution of cooperation is when there is only one minimal
barrier (a 4c-run) at the start of the game. We use this worst case scenario to determine
the absorption time. But, we need to address an issue before doing that. Although the time
calculated in this way gives the worst case for a c-run to grow until the all-cooperate state is
reached, it might not include the overhead time required if there are many runs. There are two
types of such overheads: the time spent on handling short runs that can become a barrier or
be deleted, and the time spent on merging two c-runs. We first calculate the worst case time
for these overheads in Lemma 12 and 13 respectively.
Lemma 12. Let φs denote the expected time it takes for a 1c, 2c, 3c-run to be deleted or become
a barrier (a run of length 4). Then φs = O(1).
Proof. Recall that a singleton cooperator can never grow. According to Figure 3, it is deleted
with probability
• a¯ if it is in the form 00[1]00,
• c¯ if it is in the form 10[1]01, and
• 12 (a¯+ c¯) if it is in the form 10[1]00.
We also have a¯ < c¯. Hence, the worst expected time it takes for a 1c to be removed is 1/a¯,
since it has the geometric distribution with probability of success of a¯. Now it is enough to
determine the time it takes for a 2c-run or a 3c-run to become a 1c-run or a 4c-run, as we know
that 1c’s are removed in constant time. For calculating this, consider a random walk on the
number of cooperators, i.e. {1,2,3,4}. Then we need to show that the walk reaches 1 or 4 in
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constant time irrespective of where it starts. Next we determine the corresponding probabilities
of this process.
Suppose the current position of the random walk is 2 or 3, i.e. there is a 2c-run or a 3c-run
respectively. A 2c-run or a 3c-run can exist in three forms:
• 001100 or 0011100. In this case, the probability of going to the right is b − 14b2 and the
probability of going to the left is 0.
• 001101 or 0011101. In this case, the probability of going to the right is 12b
(
1 − 12 d¯
)
and
the probability of going to the left is 12 d¯
(
1− 12b
)
.
• 101101 or 1011101. In this case, the probability of going to the right is 0 and the probability
of going to the left is d¯− 14 d¯2.
We want an upper bound on the time it takes to reach state 1 or 4. It takes longest to reach
4 if the probability of moving to the right is the minimum non-null probability, r say. If the
probability of moving to right is zero, the walk never reaches 4 and is absorbed at 0. We have
r = min
{
b− 14b2, 12b
(
1− 12 d¯
)}
.
Similarly, it takes longest to reach 1 when the probability q of moving left from 2 or 3 is
q = min
{
d¯− 14 d¯2, 12 d¯
(
1− 12b
)}
.
So we have a Gambler’s Ruin problem with absorbing barriers at 1 and 4. Using the standard
results when r + q = 1 (see, for example, Feller[2, p. 345]), if the game is started from state
ℓ ∈ {2, 3}, the expected duration of the process is
Dℓ =


ℓ
q − r −
4
q − r
1− (q/r)ℓ
1− (q/r)4 if r 6= q,
ℓ(4− ℓ) if r = q.
Let Dmax = max{D2, D3}. Clearly Dmax is constant as it only involves the constants q and
r which, in turn, can be expressed in terms of the constants S and T . There is a self-loop at 2
and 3 with constant probability, at most 1− (r+ q), but this slows down the random walk only
by a constant factor. Thus it takes only constant time to reach 1 or 4. We showed earlier that
it takes constant time to go from 1 to 0. Hence the total expected time is constant.
The other overhead of having more than one run is the time required to merge them. Two
barriers merge together when they are separated by two defectors and both defectors switch
to cooperation simultaneously. As the switching of both defectors happens independently with
some probability, there is a possibility that only one of the two defectors switches to cooperation
whereby a singleton defector is created between the two c-runs. Then, as shown in Lemma 10,
the singleton defector can grow up to length 3. And then the barriers start growing again. This
is repeated until the runs are merged. The following lemma proves that the worst case merging
time for two c-runs of length at least 4 is a constant.
Lemma 13. Let φm denote the expected time it takes for two barriers (i.e. two c-runs of length
at least 4) separated by 1 or 2 defectors to merge together. Then φm = O(1).
Proof. The merging process can be modelled as a simple absorbing Markov chain with states
Mi (0 ≤ i ≤ 3) where i denote the number of defectors in between the barriers. M0 is the ab-
sorbing state and all other states are transient. Using Figure 3, we can determine the transition
probabilities for this Markov chain. The corresponding transition matrix in canonical form is


M1 M2 M3 M0
M1 (1 − d¯/2)2 d¯(1− d¯/2) d¯2/4 0
M2 b(1− b/2) (1− b/2)2 0 b2/4
M3 b2/4 b(1− b/2) (1 − b/2)2 0
M0 0 0 0 1

 .
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Note that all transition probabilities are constants. Hence, using standard methods, absorp-
tion time can be calculated. Let τi be the absorption time when the chain starts at Mi. Then
we get

τ1τ2
τ3

 =


16b− 8b2 + b3 + 16d¯− 4bd¯− bd¯2
d¯b2(4 − b− d¯)
2(8b− 6b2 + b3 + 8d¯− 2bd¯− bd2)
d¯b2(4 − b− d¯)
16b− 12b2 + 3b3 + 16d¯− 3bd¯2
d¯b2(4 − b− d¯)


.
The worst case merging time φm = max{τ1, τ2, τ3}. Since the time calculation involves only
constants, φm is constant, and the lemma is proved.
Now we will assume that when the game is started there is a 4c-run and an (n− 4)d-run on
the cycle. The following lemma proves that it takes linear time for the 4c-run to grow up to
length n− 2.
Lemma 14. If the game is started with a 4c-run and an (n− 4)d-run on the cycle, the expected
time it takes for cooperation to spread to n− 2 positions, denoted by Tg, is Θ(n) w.h.p.
Proof. As Lemma 8 shows, an ℓc-run (ℓ ≥ 2) continues to grow as long as it is bordered by at
least two defectors. As we assume that the game is started with only a 4c-run on the cycle, this
run can grow up to length n− 2.
Now, let Ti be an upper bound on the number of steps taken to go from i cooperators to
(i + 1) cooperators on the cycle. Then, from Figure 3, the adjacent defectors at both ends of
the c-run switch to cooperation with probability 12b. Hence, the probability of increasing the
length by at least 1 is 1− (1− 12b)2. Let us denote this probability by p1. Thus we have
Pr(Ti = t) = (1 − p1)t−1p1 .
Ti has a geometric distribution with parameter p1. Hence, the total expected time Tg is
E[Tg] =
n−3∑
i=4
E[Ti] =
(n− 6)
p1
= O(n) .
Let us now bound the probability of getting large deviations from the mean E[Tg]. From
the definition of Ti, we obtain
Pr(Ti > t) ≤ (1− p1)t ≤ e−p1t .
Thus, for t = β lognp1 , we get
Pr
(
Ti >
β logn
p1
) ≤ 1
nβ
.
Thus, deviations of size βn lognp1 are unlikely. In other words, Ti lies within the range[
0, β lognp1
]
with high probability. Now, define a set of random variables Yi such that Yi =
p1Ti
β log n ,
and let Y =
∑n−3
i=4 Yi. Then, Yi ∈ [0, 1] with high probability, and we have
E[Y ] =
p1E[Tg]
β logn
=
n− 6
β logn
.
Since Y4, Y5, . . . , Yn−2 are independent random variables taking values in [0,1], we may apply
Chernoff-Hoeffding to get
Pr
(
Y /∈ (1± ε)E[Y ]) ≤ 2e− 13 ε2 n−6β logn .
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If ε = 3β logn√
n−6 , the following holds for sufficiently large n.
Pr (Y /∈ (1± ε)E[Y ]) ≤ 2e−3β logn = 2
n3β
.
It follows immediately that Tg lies within the range (1± ε)E[Tg] with high probability. Thus
we can conclude that Tg ∈ (n−6)p1 ±O(
√
n logn), so Tg = Θ(n) with high probability.
Proof of Theorem 2 (Case - I ): In the imitation process, runs just grow or decrease
in length and no runs are ever created. Decreasing in length might mean the removal of runs.
When a d-run is removed, two c-runs are merged and vice versa. Thus, the worst case absorption
time includes the following:
1. Tg - the worst case time required for c-runs to grow as much as possible, i.e. the time taken
for a single barrier to become an (n− 2)c-run which is O(n) by Lemma 14.
2. Tm - the worst case time required for merging c-runs. There can be at most O(n) runs on
the cycle. And the worst case time for merging two c-runs is O(1) by Lemma 13. Hence
the total time spent on merging c-runs is O(n).
3. Ts - the worst case time required to handle the c-runs that are not barriers. This time is
spent on growing shorter runs to become barriers or removing them. In Lemma 12, it was
shown that the time taken to handle one short run is O(1). Thus, the time to handle all
small runs is O(n).
Thus, the worst case absorption time T = Tg + Tm + Ts = O(n), as claimed. Finally, it
is worth emphasizing the fact that, in the actual process, these three different types of events
happen simultaneously. But, we have added the times in order to get an upper bound.
What remains is to show that there will be a barrier, a c-run of length greater than 3, at the
beginning of the game. But it follows from Lemma 2 that not finding a barrier is exponentially
unlikely, so the proof is complete. 
Region C (S+12 < T < 2S)
It is easily observed on Figure 5 that the only difference between the dynamics of region B
and C is: singleton cooperators adjacent to at least two defectors can grow in C, but not in B,
as proved in Lemma 9. Hence, the characteristics of C can be summarised as follows:
• a 1c-run can grow or be deleted.
• a 2c-run can grow or be deleted.
• a 3c-run can grow or be deleted
• an ℓc-run (ℓ ≥ 4) can never be deleted.
Thus, ℓc-run (ℓ ≥ 4) is a barrier in C too. Due to its similarity to B, the analysis of region
B in Section 3.1.3 will be applicable for C, apart from the time required to deal with short runs
which is determined in the lemma below.
Lemma 15. Suppose φs is the expected time it takes for a 1c, 2c, 3c-run to be deleted or become
a barrier (a run of length 4). Then, φs = O(1).
Proof. Technically speaking, 1c-runs, 2c-runs and 3c-runs perform a random walk before they
become 0c-runs or 4c-runs. Hence, we consider a random walk on the number of cooperators, i.e.
{0,1,2,3,4}. Now, it suffices to show that the walk reaches 0 or 4 in constant time irrespective
of where the walk starts.
Suppose the current position of the walk is 1, i.e. there is a 1c-run. A 1c-run can exist in
three forms giving rise to three different cases:
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• 00[1]00. In this case, the probability of moving right is a − 14a2 and the probability of
moving left is 0;
• 00[1]01. In this case, the probability of moving right is 12a
(
1− 12 c¯
)
and the probability of
moving left is 12 c¯
(
1− 12a
)
;
• 10[1]01. In this case, the probability of moving right is 0 and the probability of moving
left is c¯.
Next, suppose the current position is 2 or 3, i.e. there is 2c-run or 3c-run respectively. The
probabilities of movement from these states are the same as for region B. But we give them here
for easy reference. A 2c-run or 3c-run can exist in three forms:
• 001100 or 0011100. In this case, the probability of moving right is b− 14b2 and the proba-
bility of moving left is 0.
• 001101 or 0011101. In this case, the probability of moving right is 12b
(
1− 12 d¯
)
and the
probability of moving left is 12 d¯
(
1− 12b
)
.
• 101101 or 1011101. In this case, the probability of moving right is 0 and the probability
of moving left is d¯− 14 d¯2.
What we want is an upper bound on the time required to reach 0 or 4. It takes longest
to reach 4 if the probability of moving to the right takes the minimum non-null probability r.
Hence we get
r = min
{
a− 14a2, 12a
(
1− 12 c¯
)
, b− 14b2, 12b
(
1− 12 d¯
)}
.
Similarly, it takes longest to reach 0 when the probability q of moving left is
q = min
{
c¯, 12 c¯
(
1− 12a
)
, d¯− 14 d¯2, 12 d¯
(
1− 12b
)}
.
Now, this is simply a Gambler’s Ruin problem with absorbing barriers at 0 and 4. The worst
case expected duration of the game can therefore be calculated as in Lemma 12 and shown to
be O(1).
Proof of Theorem 2 (Case - II ): Recall that the absorption time
T = Tg +O(n)φm +O(n)φs,
where, Tg and φm are the same as for B, and φs is still O(1) for C as proved in Lemma 15.
Hence, T = O(n) w.h.p. 
Regions D (2S < T < S+12 ) and E (S < T < 2S and T <
S+1
2 )
In regions D and E, a 2c-run is a barrier. The following lemma establishes this.
Lemma 16. An ℓc-run (ℓ ≥ 2) grows or remains unchanged, hence is a barrier in D and E.
Proof. Lemma 8 proved that when a c-run of length at least two is adjacent to d-runs of length
at least two, the c-run grows in length. What is remaining to be shown is, a c-run of length
at least two is not deleted or reduced in length when it is adjacent to singleton defectors. This
is a direct result of Lemma 10 which proves that when a 1d-run is adjacent to at least two
cooperators, the 1d-run cannot grow in length in D and E.
We will call the part of the cycle not containing any barriers the non-barrier. A non-barrier-
segment is a set of vertices between two barriers. In region C, the non-barrier-segments have
only defectors and singleton cooperators. The length of each non-barrier-segment decreases
during the evolution since it has a barrier at either end which grows or remains unchanged. As
the update is done synchronously, the length of every non-barrier-segment reduces in expecta-
tion. The all-cooperate state is reached when the lengths of all non-barrier-segments reach 0.
Obviously, the absorption time is dominated by the longest non-barrier-segment present at the
beginning of the game.
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Lemma 17. Suppose Rcd is the longest non-barrier-segment at the beginning of the game and
let γ be its initial length. In regions D and E, the probability that the all-cooperate state is not
reached in γd(1−ε) generations is at most e
− ε
2γ
2(1−ε) , for any ε > 0.
Proof. Let χ be the longest non-barrier segment, spanning from vi to vj . Let σt be the length
of χ after t generations. Hence, the time t at which σt becomes 0 is the absorption time.
Let us first determine the expected minimum negative growth of the χ at its left end, i.e.
along the edge {i − 1, i}. Lemma 16 shows that ℓc-run (ℓ ≥ 2) never reduces in length. This
means that vi−1 never switches to defection. So we determine the minimum probability that vi
becomes a cooperator. The switching of vi depends on the status of vi−2, vi−1, vi+1 and vi+2.
Let Sti denote the status of the vertex vi after t generations. Using Figure 5, the following table
presents the possible values for the probability that vi becomes a cooperator in D and E.
Sti−2 Sti−1 Sti Sti+1 Sti+2 Pr
[St+1i = 1]
1 1 0 0 0 12b
1 1 0 0 1 12b
1 1 0 1 0 12d
1 1 0 1 1 d
Hence the minimum probability that the left border vi and, by symmetry, the right border
vj switch to cooperation is equal to min
{
1
2b,
1
2d
}
= 12d. Hence we have
E[σt] ≤ σt−1 − d .
This case is quite similar to Lemma 1, and the result follows by a similar argument.
Proof of Theorem 3 (Case - I): According to Lemma 5, the longest chain of d-runs
separated by singleton cooperators (non-barrier-segment) is O(log n) w.h.p. Substituting this
value for γ in Lemma 17 shows that the probability that the all-cooperate is not reached in time
O(log n)
d(1−ε) = O(log n) is at most
e
− ε
2O(logn)
2(1−ε) = e
−ε
2c1 logn
2(1−ε) = n
− ε
2c1
2(1−ε)
for any ε > 0 and a constant c1 > 0. So, for suitable values of c1 and ε, the above probability
tends to zero as n→∞ .
Hence, if there is at least one barrier (2c-run) at the beginning of the game, the game
converges to cooperation fast. Furthermore, Lemma 2 shows that the initial configuration has
a 2c-run except for exponentially small failure probability, completing the proof. 
Region F (T < S)
This region has been labelled F in Figure 1(b). The switching probabilities for this region
are given in the table below.
Si Si+1 Si−1Si+200 01 10 11
0 1 + + + +
1 0 0 0 0 0
It is clear from the table above that the evolution happening in this region is the opposite
to what happens in the region A (see Section 3.1.2 for details). More precisely, defectors are
imitated by cooperators in region A, while cooperators are imitated by defectors in region F.
Hence, the cooperation evolves fast in this region and the following lemma holds.
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Lemma 18. Suppose Rd is the longest d-run on the cycle when the game is started and let
ℓ(Rd) = γ. Provided T < S , probability that all-cooperate state is not reached in
γ
c(1−ε)
generations is at most e
− ε
2γ
2(1−ε) for any ε > 0.
Proof. Proof of this lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 7. Let ρ be defined as the minimum
of the four possible switching probabilities. Then we get
ρ = min{a, b, c, d} = c .
In this case, a d-run of length ℓ (1 ≤ ℓ < n) is reduced in length at both ends with probability
at least 12ρ and a 1c-run is deleted with probability at least ρ. Also, the absorption time here is
the time it takes for the longest d-run to be deleted. The rest of the proof is similar to that of
Lemma 7.
Proof of Theorem 3 (Case II - T < S) : The result directly follows from Lemma 18 and
Lemma 4. 
A special case for B, C, D and E
Consider the case where 1’s and 0’s appear in the cycle at alternating locations. This
configuration will not be generated by the random initial configuration w.h.p. Because, as
proved in Lemma 6, the longest chain of alternating 1’s and 0’s is O(log n) w.h.p. However, it
is worth investigating this configuration as it yields some interesting outcome.
Theorem 4. If the game ever reaches a state where every cooperator and every defector on the
cycle exist as singletons, the following statements hold with high probability.
1. the all-defect state is reached in time O(1) with probability 1 in B and D.
2. the all-cooperate state is reached, with probability strictly less than 1, in time O(log n) in
C and in time O(n) in E.
Proof. n has to be even for this scenario to occur. So, let n = 2m. The configuration in question
has alternating 1’s and 0’s throughout the cycle. In this case, all the 0’s appear as 1[0]10 having
switching probability of 0 while all the 1’s appear as 0[1]01 having switching probability of c¯ > 0
(see Figure 3). If all the 1’s switch to 0 in the same generation, then the all-defect state is
reached in a single generation. However, the probability of that happening is (c¯)m, which is
small for large m since c¯ < 1 .
Now, consider the regions B and D. It is easily seen from their dynamics on Figure 5 that
1c-runs are always deleted. In a starting configuration of alternating 1’s and 0’s, there are only
1c-runs present. Although, they all appear in the form 10[1]01 in the initial configuration, the
other forms 00[1]00 and 00[1]01 might be generated in the subsequent generations. Singleton
cooperators are then deleted in the expected time of 1/a¯ = O(1) (see, Lemma 12 for the
calculations involved). This proves the first part of the theorem.
Now consider any 15 consecutive vertices in the initial configuration vj−7 . . . vj+7 such that
Sj = 1. The probability that all cooperators in these vertices but Sj switch to defection together
is (c¯)6(1− c¯). Expected number of such cases after the first generation is n(c¯)6(1− c¯). All these
cases would have created a 1c-run that has at least 7 defectors on both sides. Recall that 1c-run
can grow in C and E when they are bordered by at least two defectors (Lemma 9). In the above
case, once the 1c-runs grow to be a run of length 2 or 3, it still has at least 2 defectors at either
side and can grow further (Lemma 8). Thus, the required barrier for a guaranteed convergence
to cooperation, i.e. a 4c-run for C and a 2c-run for E, will be created in time O(1). Then the
results follow from Theorem 2 and Theorem 3. It was remarked above that the game might
converge to the all-defect state even in C and E with probability (c¯)m. So, the probability that
all-cooperate is reached is less or equal to 1− (c¯)m < 1.
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3.1.4 Borders
We now analyse the behaviour of the games which lie on borders between regions. On these
borders, one might expect to see a mixed result of the two regions that the border separates.
The results below show this intuition is wrong.
The Line T = S + 1
This is the border between regions A and B. Let BAB denote this border. The table below
shows which of the switching probabilities are zero for BAB.
Si Si+1 Si−1Si+200 01 10 11
0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 + + 0 +
The following observations that can be verified using the table above will help our analysis.
• A 1c-run is always deleted.
• An ℓc-run (ℓ ≥ 2) can never grow.
• A 1d-run can become a 2d or a 3d-run.
• An ℓd-run (ℓ ≥ 2) cannot grow if it is bordered by at least two cooperators.
In essence, the only changes that happen in any generation are: a 1c-run is deleted, and a
1d-run becomes a 2d-run or a 3d-run. This suggest that cooperators and defectors can coexist
in a steady state as long as they are not singletons.
Theorem 5. If T = S+1, the game reaches steady state in time O(log n) with high probability.
The steady state contains d-runs and c-runs of length at least 2, and the proportion of cooperators
in the steady state is less or equal to the initial proportion.
Proof. In the evolution phase, what happens is the elimination of singleton cooperators and
extension of singleton defectors. We note the followings when we look at c-runs of different
lengths:
• An ℓc-run (ℓ ≥ 2) having at least two defectors on both sides remain unchanged.
• An ℓc-run (ℓ ≥ 3) having at least two defectors on one side and a 1d-run on the other side
can be reduced in length by at most 1 and become stable as in the previous case. The
probability that a cooperator is deleted in a generation is p1 =
1
2 d¯.
• An ℓc-run (ℓ ≥ 4) having 1d-runs at either sides can be reduced in length by at most 2
and become stable as in the first case. The probability that a cooperator is deleted in a
generation is at least p2 =
1
2 d¯.
• All other cases of c-runs are potentially deleted in the worst case. They are:
– 1c-runs. In this case, the cooperator is deleted with probability at least p3 = min
{
a¯, c¯,
1
2 (a¯+ c¯)
}
= a¯.
– 2c-runs having at least one of its neighbour as 1d-run. In this case, a cooperator is
deleted with probability at least p4 = min
{
1
2 d¯, d¯− 14 d¯2
}
= 12 d¯.
– 3c-runs having both neighbours as 1d-runs. In this case, a cooperator is deleted with
probability at least p5 = d¯− 14 d¯2.
Let ρab = min{p1, p2, p3, p4, p5}. Hence, all cooperators are deleted with probability at least
ρab in any generation. Maximum number of cooperators that any c-run can loose is 3, thus the
absorption time is the time it takes for a 3c-run to be deleted at the slowest rate. Then, by
Lemma 1, for any ε > 0, the probability that a steady state is not reached in time 3ρab(1−ε) = O(1)
is a constant. Hence, after time O(log n), the probability that a steady state is not reached is
at most n−k, for any k.
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The Line T = S+12
The line T = S+12 separates the regions B ∪ C and D ∪ E. Let us call this BBD. The
corresponding switching probabilities are given in the table below.
Si Si+1 Si−1Si+200 01 10 11
0 1 0 + 0 0
1 0 + + 0 0
It is readily verified from the above table that, on BBD, the only way the defectors can
spread is through deleting singleton cooperators. At the same time, no singleton cooperators
are created during the evolution. Hence, deleting singleton cooperators is the only setback in
the process of emergence of cooperation. In order to calculate the worst case absorption time,
we divide the process into two phases.
Phase I The singleton cooperators are allowed to disappear first, suppressing all other favourable
developments.
Phase II The rest of the evolution, assuming that there are no singleton cooperators. In this
phase, an ℓd-run (ℓ ≥ 2) reduces in length until it is of length 0 or 1. Singleton defectors
cannot be deleted on BBD.
Note that, in the actual process though, both Phase I and II happen simultaneously. So the
above gives an upper bound on the absorption time. First, we calculate the time required for
Phase I.
Lemma 19. All 1c-runs are removed in time O(1).
Proof. A 1c-run or singleton can exist in the cycle in three different surroundings, having a
different probability of removal accordingly:
• The 1c-run in 00[1]00 is deleted with probability a¯.
• The 1c-run in 00[1]01 is deleted with probability 12 (a¯+ c¯).
• The 1c-run in 10[1]01 is deleted with probability c¯.
As the update rule is synchronous, the worst case time to remove all singletons is determined
by the smallest probability of removal. That is,
ϕ1 = min
{
a¯, 12 (a¯+ c¯), c¯
}
= a¯,
as we have a¯ ≤ c¯. Using the geometric distribution, the worst expected time required to remove
all singletons is
E[Ts] =
1
ϕ1
=
1
a¯
= O(1) .
Next, we analyse Phase II. Here we analyse d-runs. As there are no 1c-runs present on
the cycle in this phase, the length of a d-run will decrease until it is removed completely or it
becomes a singleton. Since the updates are simultaneous, the time taken to reduce all d-runs is
determined by the longest d-run present in the cycle.
Lemma 20. Suppose Rd is the longest d-run on the cycle when Phase II is started and let
ℓ(Rc) = γ. If T =
S+1
2 then, for any ε > 0, the probability that a steady state is not reached in
γ
b(1−ε) generations is at most e
− ε
2γ
2(1−ε) . In the steady state, cooperators and defectors coexist.
The defector runs must be singletons and the cooperator runs cannot be singletons.
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Proof. The key idea of this proof is, all d-runs are bordered by a c-run of length at least 2
in Phase II. Consequently, the vertices at either end of a d-run switch to cooperation with
probability 12b. Hence the expected decrease in length of the d-runs is equal to b.
Also note that singleton defectors cannot be removed. Hence, all longer d-runs are either
turned into a 1d-run or are removed. The longest d-run Rd requires the longest time to delete
or reduce to a singleton. When Rd is deleted, or made into a 1d-run, the steady state will be
reached. Let ℓt be the length of Rd after t steps. Then we get
E[ℓt] ≤ ℓt−1 − b = γ − bt .
Now, the result directly follows from Lemma 1.
Theorem 6. If T = S+12 , a steady state is reached in time O(log n) w.h.p. In the steady state,
cooperators and defectors coexist. The defector runs must be singletons and the cooperators runs
cannot be singletons.
Proof. The worst case absorption time is obtained by summing the time required for Phase I
and Phase II. Lemma 19 shows the worst case time for Phase I is O(1). Lemma 20 proves that,
if T = S+12 , the probability that a steady state is not reached in
γ
b(1−ε) generations is at most
e
− ε
2γ
2(1−ε) for any ε > 0, where b = S+1−T2α and γ is the size of the longest d-run at the beginning
of Phase II.
So we merely need to bound the length γ of the longest d-run at the beginning of Phase II. We
observe that the removal of singleton cooperators in Phase I will join d-runs together. However,
we showed in Lemma 5 that the longest chain of defectors interleaved with singleton cooperators
is still O(log n) w.h.p. Combining this with the estimate γb(1−ε) completes the proof.
The Line T = S
The line T = S on the ST -plane, denoted by BFE , separates the regions F and E. The table
below shows which of the switching probabilities are zero in this case.
Si Si+1 Si−1Si+200 01 10 11
0 1 + + 0 +
1 0 0 0 0 0
Here, no cooperator ever becomes a defector. On BFE , therefore, an ℓc-run (ℓ ≥ 1) is a
barrier. Yet, a 1c-run adjacent to a 1d-run on either side cannot grow and help the convergence
to cooperation. Therefore, a barrier for BFE is an ℓc-run where ℓ ≥ 2 or a 1c-run adjacent to two
defectors. A non-barrier-segment is bounded by two such barriers. The non-barrier segments
are eliminated by successively deleting the end vertices.
There are clearly two types of non-barrier-segment for BFE : a d-run, and a run of alternating
1’s and 0’s. In both cases, the all-cooperate state is attained by the expansion of the barriers.
Lemma 21. Suppose Rcd is the longest non-barrier-segment and let γ be its initial length.
Then, if T = S, the probability that the all-cooperate state is not reached in γd(1−ε) generations
is at most e
− ε
2γ
2(1−ε) , for any ε > 0.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 17, so is omitted.
What remains is to determine the length of the longest non-barrier-segment. Obviously, in
the worst case, at the beginning of the game there will be only one barrier and the non-barrier-
segment will be of length n− 1 . Then, by Lemma 21, the worst-case absorption time is O(n)
with high probability. But, when the game is started with a random configuration, the longest
non-barrier-segment is only O(log n).
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Theorem 7. If T = S, the all-cooperate state is reached in time O(log n), with high probability.
Proof. The longest d-run present at the beginning of the game is O(log n) w.h.p by Lemma 3,
and the longest chain of alternating defectors and cooperators is O(log n) w.h.p by Lemma 6.
Hence, the longest non-barrier-segment is O(log n) w.h.p. Substituting γ in Lemma 21 completes
the proof.
Remark 3. It is readily verified that alternating 1’s and 0’s throughout the cycle is a steady
state for BFE. But, this state can never be reached unless it is the initial configuration.
The Line T = 2S
BED is the line between the regions E and D. The switching probability table given below
shows that the dynamics on this line are close to the dynamics of E. In fact, the only difference
is that singleton cooperators, having at least two defectors adjacent, can grow in E, but not
on BED. Even so, we analysed the evolution of cooperation for E without considering that
singletons can contribute to the evolution of cooperation. Only the growth of barriers was
considered. Hence, the proof of Theorem 3 also applies here.
Si Si+1 Si−1Si+200 01 10 11
0 1 0 + 0 +
1 0 0 + 0 0
Theorem 8. On the line T = 2S, the all-cooperate state will be reached in time O(log n), with
high probability.
3.2 Summary
We have proved rigorously that the games converge fast for all −1 ≤ S ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ T ≤ 2.
We have done this by grouping the games based on various relations between the payoffs. The
results are summarised below.
1. 0 ≤ T < S+12 and T 6= 2S: This encompasses regions D, E, F and the border between E and
F. In these regions, the all-cooperate state is reached in time O(log n).
2. S+12 < T < S + 1: This encompasses regions B and C. In these regions, the all-cooperate
state is reached in time O(n).
3. S + 1 < T ≤ 2: This contains region A. In this region, the all-defect state is reached in time
O(log n).
4. T = 2S: This is the border between B∪D and C∪E. On this line, the all-cooperate state is
reached in time O(n).
5. T = S+12 : This is the border between B∪C and D∪E. On this line, a steady state is reached
in time O(log n). Here cooperators and defectors can coexist indefinitely.
6. T = S + 1: This is the border between A and B. On this line, a steady state is reached in
time O(log n). Here cooperators and defectors can coexist indefinitely.
The coexistence of cooperators and defectors when T = S + 1 can be explained as follows.
When a defector earning T is adjacent to a cooperator earning S+1, the switching probability for
both players is zero (e.g. 11110000, where this applies to the middle cooperator and defector).
There is a player following the same strategy on one side and a player following a different
strategy, but with the same payoff, on the other side. Hence, there is no incentive for imitation.
The coexistence on 2T = S+1 can be explained in the same way. This happens when a singleton
defector is between two runs of cooperators (e.g. 1110111).
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Remark 4. As mentioned earlier, another version of the imitation strategy on the cycle was
studied analytically in [11], by calculating fixation probabilities. The fixation probabilities can
be calculated easily using our arguments. Let Pc be the fixation probability for the cooperator,
i.e. the probability that the game converges to cooperation when a single cooperator is added
to n − 1 defectors on the cycle. Then we have Pc = 0 for regions A, B and D; and Pc = 1 for
regions C, E and F. However, the games converge to cooperation in all but region A when a
maximum of four cooperators are introduced. This illustrates the drawbacks of analysis based
on fixation probabilities.
4 Imitation on the complete graph
In this section, we analyse the imitation update rule on the complete graph Kn. Each vertex
of the graph plays the game with all other vertices. Hence, all cooperators receive the same
accrued payoff in a given generation, and have the same switching probability. The same applies
to the defectors.
Now, let δt denote the number of cooperators in Kn at time t. Let Ptd and Ptc denote the
total payoff obtained by a defector and a cooperator respectively, at time t. As before, using
the normalisation R = 1 and P = 0, we get
Ptx =
{
δtT if x = d,
(δt − 1) + (n− δt)S if x = c.
Let ∆yx = Pty −Ptx where x, y ∈ {c, d}. Figure 8 gives the values of ∆yx for different values
of x and y. Then the switching probability for a vertex adopting the strategy x at time t, which
has chosen a vertex adopting y for imitation, is
ptx = max
{
0,
Pty − Ptx
(n− 1)α
}
= max
{
0,
∆yx
(n− 1)α
}
,
where α = max{T, 1} − min{S, 0}. Here the denominator ensures that pi ∈ [0, 1]. Note that
only ptc or p
t
d can be positive at any t.
x y ∆yx
d d 0
d c δt(1− S − T ) + nS − 1
c d −δt(1− S − T )− nS + 1
c c 0
Figure 8: Payoff difference between two players adopting x and y at time t on a complete graph.
Here, d stands for defection and c stands for a cooperation.
Theorem 9. Let θt denote the fraction of cooperators on the complete graph Kn at time t.
Suppose, for large n, that θ0, S and T satisfy
T < min
{
1, 1 +
(1− θ0)
θ0
S
}
.
and that there is at least one cooperator at the beginning of the game (i.e. θ0 ≥ 1n). Then, for
any ε > 0, the probability that the all-cooperate state is not reached in time
1
ϕdθ0
log
(
n(1 − θ0)
ε
)
is at most ε, where ϕd satisfies
ϕd < min
{
θ0(1− S − T ) + S
α
,
1− T
α
}
, with α = 1−min{S, 0} .
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Proof. Let δt = nθt. A defector switches to cooperation in any generation with some positive
probability ptd only a cooperator with higher payoff is chosen for imitation. That is, a defector
switches to cooperation at time t only if ∆cd > 0. Hence, from Figure 8, the required condition
is
∆cd = δt(1 − S − T ) + nS − 1 > 0 .
Substituting nθt for δt and rearranging, we get
T < 1 + S
(
1
θt
− 1
)
− 1
nθt
= 1 +
1
θt
(
S − 1
n
)
− S,
so, for large enough n, this condition is
T < 1 +
(1 − θt)
θt
S . (2)
As defectors become cooperators, θt increases. If S ≤ 0, inequality (2) holds as θt increases up
to 1. But, if S > 0, the inequality holds only until θt = 1 provided n is large enough and
T < 1 . (3)
Thus, if θ0, S and T satisfy inequalities (2) and (3) at t = 0, then θt increases from θ0 to 1. Let
ϕd > 0 be a lower bound on the switching probability at any step during this process. That is,
ϕd < inf
θ0≤θt<1
ptd =
θt(1 − S − T ) + S
α
= min
{
θ0(1− S − T ) + S
α
,
(1 − S − T ) + S
α
}
,
where α = max{T, 1} −min{S, 0} = 1 − min{S, 0}. Let γt denote the number of defectors at
time t. Then, we can determine the expected value of γt in terms of γt−1.
E[γt | γt−1] ≤ γt−1 − γt−1
(n− γt−1
n− 1
)
ϕd < γt−1 − γt−1
(n− γt−1
n
)
ϕd = γt−1
(
1− ϕdθt−1
)
.
We know that, under conditions (2) and (3), θt ≥ θ0 for any t ≥ 1. Substituting this in the
above inequality, we get
E[γt | γt−1] ≤ γt−1(1− ϕdθ0)
Thus, by the rule of total expectation, we have
E[γt] ≤ (1− ϕdθ0)E[γt−1] .
Applying this iteratively for 1 to t− 1, we obtain
E[γt] ≤ (1 − ϕdθ0)tE[γ0] = (1 − ϕdθ0)tγ0 .
So, for any ε > 0, when
t >
1
ϕdθ0
log
(γ0
ε
)
, (4)
we have E[γt] ≤ ε. We know that any nonzero value of γt is at least 1. Using Markov’s inequality,
we obtain
Pr[γt 6= 0] = Pr[γt ≥ 1] ≤ E[γt] ≤ ε .
Finally, substituting γ0 = n(1− θ0) into (4) completes the proof.
Theorem 10. Let θt denote the fraction of cooperators on the complete graph Kn at time t.
Suppose, for large n, that θ0, S and T satisfy
T > 1 +
1− θ0
θ0
S, and S ≤ 0,
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and that there is at least one defector at the beginning of the game (i.e. (1 − θ0) ≥ 1n). Then,
for any ε, the probability that the all-defect state is not reached in time
1
ϕc(1− θ0) log
(
nθ0
ε
)
is at most ε, where ϕc satisfies
ϕc < min
{
T − (n− 1)S
(n− 1)α ,
θ0(T + S − 1)− S
α
}
, with α = max{T, 1} − S .
Proof. This can be proved in the same way as Theorem 9. Hence, only the main differences are
highlighted here.
Let δt = nθt as earlier. For a cooperator to switch to defection at time t, the switching
probability ptc has to be positive. This is possible only if ∆dc is positive. Hence, from Figure 8,
we have
∆dc = −δt(1− S − T )− nS + 1 > 0 .
Substituting δt = nθt into the above inequality and solving for T yields
T > 1 + S
(
1
θt
− 1
)
− 1
nθt
= 1 +
1
θt
(
S − 1
n
)
− S .
For large enough n, this is
T > 1 +
1− θt
θt
S . (5)
As cooperators become defectors, θt decreases. Inequality (5) continues to hold during this
process if
S ≤ 0 . (6)
So, if inequalities (5) and (6) hold initially, the game converges to defection. The proof can be
completed by estimating E[δt] in terms of δ0, as in Theorem 9.
Corollary 1. Let T, S, and θ0 be such that the cooperators and defectors receive equal payoffs
at the start of the game. That is,
T = 1 +
1
θ0
(
S − 1
n
)
− S, or equivalently δ0 = nS − 1
T + S − 1 .
Then all players maintain their initial strategy indefinitely.
This is the line in the ST plane which divides the regions where the all-cooperate state is
reached fast (see Theorem 9) and the all-defect state is reached fast (see Theorem 10).
Next we deal with the remaining region. This corresponds roughly to the Snowdrift game.
Theorem 11. Let δt denote the number of cooperators at time t. Then, the following statements
fail with probability exponentially small in n. If δ0 is outside the range δ
∗ ± n1/2+ε, for any
constant ε > 0, S > 0 and T ≥ 1, then δt reaches this range in time O(log n) where
δ∗ =
nS − 1
(S + T − 1) .
Thereafter, if δ∗ is an integer, δt becomes δ∗ in time O(log n log logn) and remains with δt = δ∗
forever. If δ∗ is not an integer, then either the all-cooperate or the all-defect state will eventually
be reached, after nO(n) time.
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Proof. If δt(1−S−T )+nS−1 > 0, defectors inKn become cooperators with non-null probability
while the cooperators remain as cooperators. Note that we have S + T > 1. Hence the above
inequality can be rewritten as
δt <
nS − 1
S + T − 1 = δ
∗ .
Similarly, if the following inequality is satisfied, the cooperators become defectors with non-
null probability while the defectors remain as defectors.
δt >
nS − 1
S + T − 1 = δ
∗ .
Finally, it can easily be verified that if δt = δ
∗, the switching probabilities of both cooperators
and defectors are zero. In short, δt oscillates around δ
∗ for a given S and T as follows:
• if δt < δ∗, then δt+1 ≥ δt
• if δt > δ∗, then δt+1 ≤ δt
• if δt = δ∗, then, δt+1 = δ∗. Note that this can only happen if δ∗ is an integer.
First, suppose δt > δ
∗. Then, we have that δt − δt+1 is binomial Bin(δt, pt), where
pt =
n− δt
n− 1
δt(S + T − 1)− nS + 1
T (n− 1) . (7)
So we have
E[δt+1] = δt − δtn− δt
n− 1
δt(S + T − 1)− nS + 1
T (n− 1) . (8)
Similarly, for the case where δt < δ
∗, we have δt+1 − δt is Bin(n− δt, ρt), where
ρt =
δt
n− 1
−(δt(S + T − 1)− nS + 1)
T (n− 1) , (9)
and
E[δt+1] = δt − (n− δt) δt
n− 1
δt(S + T − 1)− nS + 1
T (n− 1) . (10)
It is clear from (8) and (10) that the drift towards δ∗ is symmetrical. The rest of the proof,
therefore, considers only the case where δt > δ
∗. Now, let ∆t be the number of cooperators with
binomial distribution Bin(∆t, γt), where
γt =
∆t(S + T − 1)− nS + 1
T (n− 1) . (11)
Let I denote the interval δ∗ ± n1/2+ε for any constant ε. Suppose ∆τ = δτ > δ∗ + n1/2+ε. Let
T = min{t > τ | δτ ∈ I}. Then, the process δτ . . . δT is stochastically dominated by ∆τ . . .∆T
since we have γt > pt. We now prove that the probability that δt becomes less than δ
∗ is
exponentially small when t ≤ T . Let βt = ∆t/(n− 1), and
β∗ =
(nS − 1)
(n− 1)(S + T − 1) ∼
S
S + T − 1 ,
so (11) becomes
γt = (βt − β∗) (S + T − 1)
T
= (βt − β∗)s, (12)
where
s =
(S + T − 1)
T
,
so s is bounded away from 0 and 1. Also we have
E[βt+1] = βt − βt(βt − β∗)s . (13)
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Let ∆∗ = (n− 1)β∗. While ∆t ≥ ∆∗, we have E[∆t+1] ≥ ∆∗ since
E[∆t+1] = ∆t −∆t(βt − β∗)s > ∆∗
holds whenever βts < 1 which is always true. Let (1 − x)E[∆t+1] = ∆∗. Then, from (13) and
using β∗ ≤ βt ≤ 1, we obtain
x = 1− ∆
∗
∆t −∆t(βt − β∗)s
= 1− β
∗
βt − βt(βt − β∗)s
=
βt − β∗
βt
1− βts
1− βts+ β∗s
≥ (1− s)(βt − β∗) = (1− S)
T
(βt − β∗), (14)
and
E[∆t+1] = ∆t −∆t(βt − β∗)s
= (n− 1)(βt − β2t s+ βtβ∗s)
≥ (n− 1)(βt − βts+ βtβ∗s)
= (n− 1)βt(1− s+ β∗s)
≥ (n− 1)β∗(1 − s+ S/T ) . (15)
Now, using the Chernoff bound, we have
Pr(∆t+1 ≤ ∆∗) = Pr(∆t+1 ≤ (1− x)E[∆t+1]) ≤ exp
(− 13x2E[∆t+1]),
so when βt ≥ β∗ + n−1/2+ε, using (14) and (15) we get
Pr(∆t+1 ≤ ∆∗) < exp
(− αn2ε), (16)
which is exponentially small for any constant ε > 0, where α = β∗(1− S)2(1− s+ S/T )/(3T 2).
Stochastic domination then implies that, when δt ≥ δ∗ + n1/2+ε, δt decreases steadily, except
for some exponentially small probability. By symmetry, we have that if δt ≤ δ∗ − n1/2+ε, δt
increases steadily, except for exponentially small probability.
Let σt = δt/(n− 1), and
σ∗ =
(nS − 1)
(n− 1)(S + T − 1) ∼
S
S + T − 1 ,
so (7) becomes
pt = (1− σt + 1/(n− 1))(σt − σ∗) (S + T − 1)
T
= qt(σt − σ∗), (17)
where
(1/(n− 1))(S + T − 1)
T
≤ qt ≤ (1− σ∗ + 1/(n− 1))(S + T − 1)
T
,
so qt is bounded away from 0 and 1. (Similarly, we have ρt = zt(σ
∗ − σt), where 0 < zt ≤
σ∗(S + T − 1)/T < 1.) Also (8) becomes
E[σt+1] = σt − σt(1− σt + 1/(n− 1))(σt − σ∗)(S + T − 1)/T . (18)
We suppose σ0 = 1 (i.e. n− 1 defectors at t = 0). Next we determine the time it takes for σt
to drop into the range σ∗ ± n−1/2+ε.
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First, consider σt ≥ 12 (1 + σ∗). Then (18) implies
E[σt+1] ≤ σt − λ(1− σt + 1/(n− 1)) ≤ σt − λ(1 − σt), (19)
where λ = σ∗2(S+T−1)/2T . We have immediately E[σ1] ≤ 1−λ/(n−1). Assume by induction
that E[σt] ≤ 1− λ(1 + λ)t−1/(n− 1). Then, from (19),
E[σt+1] ≤ σt − λ(1 − σt) ≤ 1− λ(1 + λ)
t−1
n− 1 −
λ2(1 + λ)t−1
n− 1 = 1−
λ(1 + λ)t
n− 1 ,
continuing the induction. Thus, at time t0 = O(log n), we will have E[σt0 ] <
1
2 (1 + σ
∗). Then
(18) implies
E[σt+1 − σ∗] ≤ σt − σ∗ − µ(σt − σ∗) = (1− µ)(σt − σ∗), (20)
where µ = (1− σ∗)σ∗(S + T − 1)/2T . We have E[σt0 − σ∗] ≤ 12 (1− σ∗), and t0 = O(log n), so,
at time t1 = O(log n), we will have E[σt1 ] ≤ σ∗ + n−1/2+ε, for any constant ε > 0. We will also
have σt1 > σ
∗, except for exponentially small probability, from (16).
When t > t1, we require more careful analysis. As σt+1 can be greater or less than σ
∗, we
will consider the quantity (σt+1 − σ∗)2. That is,
E[(σt+1 − σ∗)2] = E[(σt+1 −E[σt+1])2] +
(
E[σt+1]− σ∗
)2
.
Here, E[(σt+1 − E[σt+1])2] can be determined from the variance of Bin(δt, pt) if σt > σ∗, and
from the variance of Bin(n − δt, ρt) if σt < σ∗, by scaling. Below we use the fact that the
variance of Bin(m, p) is mp(1− p) ≤ mp. Now, using (17), (20) and that the drift around σ∗ is
symmetrical, we get
E[(σt+1 − σ∗)2] = E[(σt+1 −E[σt+1])2] +
(
E[σt+1]− σ∗
)2
≤ et|σt − σ
∗|
(n− 1)2 + (1− µ)
2(σt − σ∗)2, where et = δtqt or (n− δt)zt
<
|σt − σ∗|
(n− 1) + (1− µ)
2(σt − σ∗)2
≤ (σt − σ∗)2
( c0
(n− 1)|σt − σ∗| + (1− µ)
2
)
< (1− µ)(σt − σ∗)2,
for some constant c0, provided
|σt − σ∗| > c0
(n− 1)µ(1− µ) ∼ c1/n,
for some constant c1. Observe that this applies both when σt ≥ σ∗ and σt < σ∗.
Thus, at time t2 = O(log n), we will have either |σt2−σ∗| ≤ c1/n or E[(σt2−σ∗)2] ≤ c21/nk+2,
for any constant k. In the latter case, using Markov’s inequality, we have
Pr
(|σt2 − σ∗| ≥ c1/n) = Pr ((σt2 − σ∗)2 ≥ c21/n2) ≤ 1/nk.
So, in either case, we will have |σt2 − σ∗| ≤ c1/n with probability at least 1− 1/nk, for any k.
Thus, at t = t2, we have |σt − σ∗| = c2/(n − 1), for some constant c2 ≥ 1. Then we have
|δt − (n− 1)σ∗| = (n− 1)|σt − σ∗| = c2. Also
pt ∼ c2(1− σ
∗ + 1/(n− 1))(S + T − 1)
(n− 1)T ∼
c3
n− 1 ,
for some constant c3. So δt − δt+1 is approximately binomial Bin
(
(n− 1)σ∗, c3/(n− 1)
)
, which
is approximately Poiss
(
c3σ
∗).
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Suppose (n − 1)σ∗ is an integer ℓ. Then Pr(δt+1 = ℓ) is a constant. If this occurs, we
have pt = 0, so the process will remain at δt = ℓ forever. If it does not occur, we will have
|δt+1 − ℓ| = O(log n) with probability at least 1 − n−k, for any k. Thus, after a further time
O(log logn), we will again have that Pr(δt+1 = ℓ) is a constant. After O(log n) repetitions of
this, we will have Pr(δt = ℓ) = 1 − n−k, for any k. The total time for this to occur will be
O(log n log logn).
If (n−1)σ∗ is not an integer, then |σt−σ∗| = Ω(1/n) for all t. So Pr
(
δt+1 ∈ {0, n}
)
= n−O(n),
for all t. Thus, after time nO(n), we will have δt+1 ∈ {0, n} with high probability.
Remark 5. If δ∗ < n/2, the game eventually converges to defection with higher probability,
whereas, if δ∗ < n/2, the game eventually converges to cooperation with higher probability. To
see this, suppose δ∗ < n/2. Then, due to the symmetry about δ∗, we have
Pr[δT = 0] = Pr[δT = 2δ
∗],
at time T . Moreover, even after reaching 2δ∗, it still takes exponential time for δt to reach n,
the all-cooperate state. Hence, the game will reach the all-defect state with higher probability.
Similarly, the game will reach cooperation with higher probability when δ∗ > n/2.
5 Simulations
Since our results are largely asymptotic, we have also simulated the imitation update rule on
the cycle and the complete graph. The results are presented in this section.
5.1 Cycle graph
Figures 9 and 10 show the results obtained for the cycle. Each data point in these figures
represents an average of 100 repetitions. The simulations were run for 100× 100 different values
of S and T, with an initial configuration having cooperators uniformly distributed on the cycle.
Figures 9 shows the fraction of cooperators present on a cycle of length 100 after 10000
generations. When the game is started with 10% cooperators, the game converges to the all-
defect state if T > S+1 (region A); whereas, to the all-cooperate state if T > (S+1)/2 (regions
C, E, and F). These results agree with our analytical results in Section 3.1.2 and Section 3.1.3.
Now, in the region where 2S ≤ T ≤ S + 1 (regions B and D), the average cooperators after
10000 generations is around 60%. Closer examination of the results shows that this is because
the game reaches the all-defect state fast around 40% of the time and the all-cooperate state fast
around 60% of the time. This is not surprising, since when the cooperators proportion is as low
as 10%, the required barriers might not be present at the beginning of the game. More precisely,
recall that region B needs 4 consecutive (4c-run) cooperators for a guaranteed convergence to
cooperation. When n = 100 and pc = 0.10, the expected number of such barriers present at the
beginning of the game is very low (0.01). In region D, the smallest barrier is two consecutive
cooperators (2c-run). Here again, the expected number of barriers is low (1.00).
This raises an interesting question: how can the game converge to cooperation all the time
in C and E, which also need a barrier of 4 and 2 consecutive cooperators, respectively? The
answer is simple. In C and E, a singleton cooperator (1c-run) can spread if it has two defectors
adjacent to it. However, we did not consider a singleton cooperator as a barrier in our analysis
in Section 3.1.3. Because, even in these regions, when a singleton cooperator (1c-run) is adjacent
to a singleton defector (1d-run), it might become a defector.
With this explanation, it is not surprising that, when the game is started with 25% cooper-
ators, the convergence towards the all-cooperate state is more frequent (more than 98%) when
2S ≤ T ≤ S + 1. This is shown in Figure 9(b). This is even more apparent in Figure 10 which
shows the contour plotted for the game started with 50% cooperators. In this case, there are
clearly only two different behaviours, except for some minor border effects. It can be observed
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(a) When game started with 10% coop-
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(b) When game started with 25% coop-
erators at random positions.
Figure 9: Fraction of cooperators on the cycle of length 100 after 10000 generations plotted as
a contour for varying S and R.
that the average cooperators after 1000 generations is little less than 100% in some places. But,
it is clear that the game converges to cooperation before 10000 generations even in these cases.
Finally, all the plots show some minor effects along the line T = S+12 and some noticeable
effect along the line T = S + 1. This is due to the differences in switching probabilities along
these borders. Again, this concurs with our analytical results in Section 3.1.4, that cooperators
and defectors can coexist in these cases.
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(a) After 1000 generations.
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(b) After 10000 generations.
Figure 10: Fraction of cooperators on the cycle of length 100 plotted as a contour for varying
S and R, when the game is started with 50% cooperators at random positions.
5.2 Complete graph
For the complete graph, as shown in Section 4, the exact number of cooperators present at the
beginning of the game determines whether the game converges to defection or cooperation in
the quadrant SH. For this reason, each simulation was started with a fixed number of players.
The result obtained are plotted as a contour for varying S and T in Figure 11.
Here again, the results agree with our rigorous analysis. In SG region, the game did not reach
a steady state even after 10000 steps. Investigation of the data reveals that the percentage of the
cooperator after 10000 steps is close to the value of θ∗ obtained in the analysis (e.g. θ∗ = 0.49
when n = 100, T = 1.5, and S = 0.5). Also, it is clear that the initial cooperator percentage
determines the line in SH region which divides the region with the all-cooperate steady state
from the region with the all-defect steady state (e.g. the line is T ≈ S + 1 when n = 100 and
θ0 = 0.5).
Finally, we note that Santos et al. [15] also produced simulations for complete graphs. Our
simulations agree with theirs.
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(a) Initial cooperators = 25%.
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(b) Initial cooperators = 50%.
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(c) Initial cooperators = 75%.
Figure 11: Fractions of cooperators after 10000 generations on the complete graph of size 100
with different initial configurations plotted as a contour for varying S and R.
6 Discussion
We have studied the imitation update rule in two extreme cases of graph topology. First, for
the cycle, we have proved that all games converge to either cooperation or defection fast. More
precisely, if T > S + 1, the games converge to the all-defect state fast; and if T < S + 1, the
games converge to the all-cooperate state fast. Even within these regions, the convergence rate
for the games is different for different values of the payoffs. It is notable from the analytical
results that the closer the point (S, T ) is to the line T = S+1, the slower the convergence. The
fact that the cooperators cannot form a barrier (or a cluster as Nowak and May [9] call it) in PD
region seems to suggest that one dimensional graphs cannot help the evolution of cooperation
through network reciprocity.
We highlight the fact that, for the complete graph also, all four games converge to cooperation
or defection. But the rate of convergence is exponentially slow in n for the SG game. We
note that experimental studies, including [9, 15], have wrongly concluded that cooperators and
defectors can coexist indefinitely. Our results show that this is true for the complete graph only
for some very particular values of S and T . In the SG region, as we have proved, the number of
cooperators oscillates around a value, δ∗, for an exponential amount of time. We showed that
convergence to cooperation is more likely after an exponential time if δ∗ is closer to n, and the
convergence to defection is more likely if δ∗ is closer to 0. For some special values of S and T ,
where δ∗ is an integer, δ∗ cooperators is a steady state. In this state, cooperators and defectors
earn equal payoff. We have proved that, for these special values of S and T , the convergence to
this steady state happens fast.
7 Conclusions and open problems
We have shown that indefinite coexistence of cooperators and defectors is impossible on the
cycle, except for some special values of S and T . More precisely, the coexistence is only possible
for games where T = S+1 or T = (S+1)/2. Furthermore, we have shown that, for all the games
studied, a steady state is reached for cycles in polynomial time. That is, cooperation emerges
rapidly when S + 1 > T and T 6= (S + 1)/2; defection emerges rapidly when S + 1 < T ; and, a
steady state with cooperators and defectors is reached rapidly when T = S+1 and T = (S+1)/2.
We also analysed the imitation strategy on complete graphs. The analysis reveals that defection
emerges fast for Prisoner’s Dilemma game, and cooperation emerges fast for Harmony game.
In the Stag Hunt game, either cooperation or defection emerges fast depending on the initial
proportion of cooperators. In the Snowdrift game, a metastable state is reached fast. In this
state, the proportion of cooperators fluctuates around a fixed value for exponential time, before
converging to cooperation or defection.
It remains as an open question whether there are graphs other than the cycle on which
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cooperators and defectors cannot coexist. An interesting extension of this work would be to
study rigorously the imitation strategy on other graphs, such as trees and grids. In particular,
based on simulations presented in [14], regular lattices seem to show very similar, if not the
same, behaviour to the complete graphs for the whole ST region. But it does not appear that
a similar analysis can be used to prove this.
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